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Appellant, Timothy Bosch, by and through his counsel of 
record, Suitter Axland Armstrong & Hanson, and pursuant to Rule 
24(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court and the Stipulation 
of counsel and Order of this Court allowing consolidation, submits 
the following Brief. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant 
to Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court in that this 
is an appeal taken from a final order of the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented to this Court for re-
view: 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding, as matter of 
law, that since defendant was plaintiffs "employer" as that 
term is defined by Utah Code § 35-1-42, it was immune from 
plaintiff's negligence action pursuant to Utah Code § 35-1-60? 
2. Did the trial court err in concluding, as a matter 
of law, that defendant did not waive its § 35-1-60 immunity 
as required by Utah Code § 35-1-57 by failing to comply with 
the provisions of Utah Code § 35-1-46 which requires all em-
ployers to secure worker's compensation benefits for their 
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employees by insuring through the Worker's Compensation Fund 
of Utah, by insuring through a private carrier or by furnishing 
proof of self-insurance? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
This Court's interpretation of the following statutes, 
appended to this Brief as Appendix "A", is pertinent to the deter-
mination of the issues presented for review: 
1. Utah Code § 35-1-42 (Code-Co 1987-88) 
2. Utah Code § 35-1-46 (Code-Co 1987-88) 
3. Utah Code § 35-1-57 (Code-Co 1987-88) 
4. Utah Code § 35-1-60 (Code-Co 1987-88) 
5. Utah Code § 35-1-62 (Code-Co 1987-88); and 
6. Utah Code § 35-1-107 (Code-Co 1987-88). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, This is a tort action brought by the 
plaintiff alleging negligence on the part of the defendant for 
its failure to provide a safe workplace and safe working conditions. 
On December 1, 1981, plaintiff slipped off a steel beam at defen-
dants construction site and fell approximately 2 0 feet to the 
ground shattering his legs and feet, crushing his spinal cord and 
breaking his jaw. At the time of his fall, plaintiff was employed 
by Thermal Energy Manufacturing Corporation ("TEAM"), a subcontrac-
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tor of the owner and developer of the project, defendant Busch 
Development, Inc. 
Plaintiff's Complaint seeks damages from the defendant 
on the theory that defendant breached its duty to provide a safe 
workplace and working conditions for its contractors' employees. 
Specifically, plaintiff contends that defendant refused to allow 
plaintiff and his co-employees to utilize a hydraulic lift to remove 
clamps holding rock facing panels in place because those lifts 
were scratching the sidewalk. As a result, plaintiff and his co-
employees were forced to cross narrow steel beams to remove the 
clamps. On one of his trips across a steel beam to remove the 
clamps, plaintiff fell and was critically injured. 
B. Course of Proceedings. On October 22, 1987, the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, entered an Order granting defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and denying plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. The Order was supported by the court's 
Memorandum Decision dated September 28, 1987, in which the court 
held that defendant was plaintiff's "employer" under the provisions 
of the Worker's Compensation Act and that, as an employer, defendant 
was immune from tort liability. 
In denying plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judg-
ment, the Court concluded that even though the defendant failed 
to comply with the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act 
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which require all "employers" to obtain insurance with the Worker's 
Compensation Fund of Utah a private carrier, or by furnishing ade-
quate proof of self-insurance, it, nevertheless, was immune from 
tort liability. The Memorandum Decision and Order are appended 
to this Brief as Appendices "B" and "C", respectively. 
In this appeal, plaintiff does not contend that the court 
erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that defendant was plain-
tiff's "employer" as that term is defined by the Worker's Compensa-
tion Act. 
C. Statement of Relevant Facts. In light of plaintiff's decision 
to not seek review of the court's conclusion that defendant was 
plaintiff's "employer" as that term is defined by Utah Code § 35-
1-42, only the following facts are material to this Court's deter-
mination of this appeal and are supported by Defendant's Memorandum 
in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and the Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment appended hereto as Appendices 
"D" and "E", respectively: 
1. TEAM was plaintiff's actual employer (Appendix "D", 
1 2) ; 
2. Defendant was the owner and developer of the project 
on which plaintiff was injured and TEAM was one of defendants' 
subcontractors (Appendix "D", f 1); 
3. Plaintiff was critically injured on December 1, 
1981, when he slipped from a steel beam and fell 20 feet to 
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the ground (Plaintiff's Complaint, attached as Appendix "F", 
11 5, 6); 
4. Plaintiff's Complaint alleged negligence against 
defendant for failure to provide a safe workplace and safe 
working conditions. These allegations were not at issue in 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Appendix "F", f 8); 
5. At the time plaintiff was injured, defendant 
did not purchase or maintain worker's compensation cover-
age for the plaintiff, nor did it provide proof of self-
insurance to the Industrial Commission (Appendix "E", 
11). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I of this Brief contends that the trial court erred 
in concluding, as a matter of law, that defendant, as one of plain-
tiff's "employers" as that term is defined by Utah Code § 35-1-
42, was immune from tort liability for its negligence. This argu-
ment is based on the language and history of Section 3 5-1-42 and 
Section 3 5-1-62 and the decisions of this Court interpreting those 
sections. This argument is supported by the Brief of Appellant 
and Points I and II of the Brief of Utah Chapter AFL-CIO and United 
Mine Workers of America, District 22, Amici Curiae, filed in the 
companion appeal entitled, Pate vs. Marathon Steel Companyf et 
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al., No. 20485, argued December 16, 1987, which plaintiff incor-
porates by reference. 
Point II of this Brief contends that even if defendant 
was plaintiff's "employer" pursuant to the definition that terms 
in of the Worker's Compensation Act and was, therefore, immune 
from suit under § 35-1-60, that immunity was lost when defendant 
failed to obtain worker's compensation insurance for the plain-
tiff or provide adequate proof to the commission of defendant's 
financial ability to pay benefits to the plaintiff is he was in-
jured. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
DEFENDANT, WHICH WAS NOT PLAINTIFF'S ACTUAL 
EMPLOYER, IS NOT IMMUNE FROM TORT LIABILITY 
FOR PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES 
It is undisputed in this appeal that defendant was not 
plaintiff's actual employer. Further, since the issue of defen-
dant's negligence was not decided by the trial court, that negli-
gence must be presumed for purposes of this appeal. Thus, the 
issue is whether defendant is immune from tort liability for its 
negligence by virtue of Utah Code § 35-1-60 or whether Utah Code 
§ 35-1-62 allows tort claims against all persons who are not the 
injured employee's actual employer. 
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On this issue, plaintiff incorporates by reference and 
hereby adopts the arguments set forth in Points I and II of the 
Brief of the Utah Chapter of the AFL-CIO and United Mine Workers 
of America, District 222, Arnica Curiae, filed in the companion 
appeal, Pate vs. Marathon Steel Company, et al., No. 20485, argued 
December 16, 1987. 
For the reasons set forth in that Brief, this Court should 
hold that Utah Code § 35-1-62 allows claims such as that 
brought by the plaintiff against the defendant despite the provi-
sions of Utah Code § 35-1-60 and, consequently, the trial court's 
order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant should be 
reversed and the case remanded for trial. 
II 
DEFENDANT WAIVED THE IMMUNITY CONFERRED BY 
THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT BY 
FAILING TO COMPLY WITH 
UTAH CODE § 35-1-46 
Utah Code § 35-1-46 provides that: 
Employers shall secure the payment of worker's 
compensation benefits for their employees: (a) 
by insuring, and keeping insured, the payment 
of this compensation with the Worker's Compe-
nsation Fund of Utah, which payments shall com-
mence within 90 days after any final award by 
the commission; (b) by insuring, and keeping 
insured, the payment of this compensation with 
any stock corporation or mutual association au-
thorized to transact the business of worker's 
compensation insurance in this state, which pay-
ment shall commence within 90 days after any 
final award by the commission; (c) by furnishing 
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annually to the commission satisfactory proof 
of financial ability to pay direct compensation 
in the amount, in the manner, and when due as 
provided for in this title . . . . 
Utah Code § 35-1-46 (Code-Co 1987-88). Defendant did none of these 
with respect to the plaintiff, its "statutory employee". 
Employers who fail to comply with Utah Code § 35-1-46: 
Shall not be entitled to the benefits of this 
title during the period of non-compliance, 
but shall be liable in a civil action to their 
employees for damages suffered by reason of 
personal injuries arising out of or in the 
course of employment caused by the wrongful 
act, neglect or default of the employer or 
any of the employer's officers, agents or em-
ployees . . . . In such action a defendant 
shall not avail himself of any of the following 
defenses: the defense of the fellow servant 
rule, the defense of assumption of risk, or 
the defense of contributory negligence. Proof 
of the injury shall constitute prima facia 
evidence of negligence on the part of the em-
ployer and the burden shall be upon the employer 
to show freedom from negligence resulting from 
such injury. And such employer shall also be 
subject to the provisions of the two sections 
next succeeding. In any civil action permitted 
under this section against the employer, the 
employee shall be entitled to necessary costs 
and a reasonable attorney's fees assessed 
against the employer. 
Utah Code § 35-1-57 (Code-Co 1987-88). 
Despite the fact that the trial court concluded that 
defendant was plaintiff's "employer" as defined by § 35-1-42 of the 
Worker's Compensation Act so that it could enjoy immunity from 
tort actions for its negligence, the trial court also concluded 
that defendant, although not satisfying the letter of Utah Code 
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Ann, § 35-1-46, satisfied the spirit of that section by contracting 
with TEAM for TEAM to provide worker's compensation insurance for 
the plaintiff. Appendix "B", p. 5. According to the trial court, 
the purpose and intent of the Worker's Compensation Act is to, among 
other things, insure that worker's compensation insurance and bene-
fits are provided to the various individual workers. Id. 
The purpose and intent of the Worker's Compensation Act 
to insure that worker's compensation insurance is provided, as 
identified by the trial court, corresponds with the legislature's 
enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42, which defines "employer" 
as including persons or entities which are not, in fact, the injured 
worker's actual employer. This conscious inclusion of persons or 
entities, not the worker's actual employer, within the definition 
of "employer" can only be ascribed to a goal of providing duplica-
tive worker's compensation coverage to fulfill the Act's purpose. 
There is simply no other reason why it would be necessary to include 
entities, such as the defendant in this case, within the definition 
of "employer" other than insuring that duplicative coverage was 
obtained or, as will be discussed below, to assure control of the 
Industrial Commission over the safety practices and procedures 
employed by the those entities, not the worker's actual employer. 
There are many reasons why duplicative coverage is neces-
sary to satisfy the goals of the Worker's Compensation Act. Pri-
marily, by requiring entities, not the worker's actual employer, 
- 10 -
to obtain coverage for the worker avoids the problem of an insolvent 
and uninsured subcontractor. Under that scenario, injured workers 
can look to the next level of "employer" for their worker's compen-
sation benefits. Another scenario could involve the insolvency 
of the actual employer's worker's compensation insurance carrier. 
If the actual employer were also insolvent, injured workers could 
look to the next level of "employer" for coverage. A third situa-
tion could arise when workers are injured when they are not acting 
in the course and scope of their employment with their actual em-
ployers. For example, an employee of an electrical subcontractor 
could be asked by the general contractor, a "statutory employer," 
to assist the piping subcontractor in laying pipe. If the employee 
was injured while working for the piping subcontractor, the employ-
ee's actual employer's carrier could arguably deny coverage. Since 
the piping subcontractor is neither the injured employee's actual 
employer nor statutory employer, the injured employee could then 
look to the statutory employer for worker's compensation benefits. 
It follows that if the avowed purpose of the broad defi-
nition of "employer" to include persons or entities, not the em-
ployee's actual employer, is to assure worker's compensation bene-
fits are paid, duplicative coverage is necessary to meet that pur-
pose, and the mere assurance by the "statutory employer" that the 
actual employer obtains coverage for the worker is insufficient. 
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A construction of § 35-1-46 as requiring duplicative 
coverage is supported by other provisions of the Worker's Compen-
sation Act. Section 35-1-107 creates an Uninsured Employer's Fund 
for the purpose of paying injured persons worker's compensation 
benefits when "every employer of the claimant who is found to be 
individually, jointly, or severally liable becomes or is insolvent, 
appoints or has appointed a receiver, or otherwise does not have 
sufficient funds, insurance, sureties or other security to cover 
worker's compensation liabilities under the Worker's Compensation 
Act." When such a situation arises, all of those employers who 
have no insurance are subject to third-party tort claims pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-57, and the Uninsured Employers' Fund is 
subrogated to the extent of benefits paid to the rights of the 
injured worker. Furthermore, the injured employee will still re-
ceive worker's, compensation benefits from the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund. 
It is also important to note that Utah Code Ann. § 3 5-
1-107 contemplates a hierarchy of responsibility among an injured 
worker's employers for worker's compensation benefits. If the 
injured worker's actual employer is insolvent or has no insurance, 
the injured worker will then seek benefits from the next level 
employer and continue up the ladder until benefits are paid. This 
concept strongly militates in favor of plaintiff's argument that 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-46 requires duplicative coverage to insure 
- 12 -
that the purpose of the Act to provide worker's compensation bene-
fits is met. 
A second obvious purpose of the Utah Worker's Compensation 
Act is to assure safety for workers. For example: 
(a) Section 3 5-1-12 prohibits employers from con-
structing, occupying or maintaining unsafe places of employ-
ment, and knowingly permitting employees to be in unsafe places 
of employment, and failing to provide safety devices and safe-
guards for employees, and failing to obey or follow orders 
of the Industrial Commission to adopt and use safe methods 
and processes necessary to render the place of employment 
safe, and failing or neglecting to do every other thing rea-
sonably necessary to protect the life, health, safety and wel-
fare of those employees. Employers who fail to comply with 
§ 35-1-12 are subjected to a surcharge of 15% on the amount 
of compensation paid to the injured employee. 
(b) Section 35-1-15 allows the Industrial Commis-
sioner or any employee of the Industrial Commission to enter 
any place of employment to collect facts, statistics or examine 
the provisions made for the health, safety and welfare of 
the employees. 
To construe the provisions of the Worker's Compensation 
Act as advocated by the defendant destroys any incentive on the 
part of "statutory employers" to comply with the provisions of 
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the Act. After all, if only the actual employer is required to 
insure the employees and an employee is injured by reason of the 
negligence of a "statutory employer", in violation of § 35-1-12, 
the 15% surcharge on compensation paid would be unfair to the actual 
employer's worker's compensation insurance carrier. It would also 
be unfair to the actual employer, since its worker's compensation 
premiums are based upon the risk assumed. 
It should be pointed out, that under defendant's proposed 
construction of the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act, 
the more control that an owner or general contractor has over a 
subcontractor, the more likely that the owner or general contractor 
will be deemed a "statutory employer." Consequently, statutory 
employers who direct every action of the subcontractor's employees 
and totally control the subcontractor's actions, are encouraged 
by defendant's proposed construction of the Act to do so negli-
gently. After all, if the employee is injured, the element of 
control will convert the owner or general contractor into a "sta-
tutory employer" which is immune from civil court actions pursuant 
to the Act. 
Carrying defendant's proposed construction of the Act 
further, the "statutory employer" need not even obtain worker's 
compensation coverage for the employee. "Statutory employers" 
can then enjoy the best of both worlds. They exercise absolute 
control over the subcontractor's employees to the point where the 
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subcontractor cannot question the "statutory employer's" judgment 
with respect to safety, they require the subcontractor to obtain 
compensation coverage, and they can run roughshod over the job 
site negligently directing the subcontractors employees. If those 
employees are injured, the "statutory employer" is absolutely immune 
from liability for its negligence. This construction is nonsen-
sical. The more control exercised, the more likely the owner or 
general contractor will be deemed an immune "statutory employer." 
This control negates any control the subcontractor has concerning 
the safety of its employees. Nevertheless, it is the subcontractor 
and its worker's compensation insurance carrier who must bear the 
financial burden of the "statutory employer's" negligence. 
The other side of the coin is similarly nonsensical. 
The more control the subcontractor has over the details of the 
work performed by its employees, including safety, the less likely 
it will be that the owner or general contractor is deemed a "statu-
tory employer." The owner or general contractor is, therefore, 
unable to cloak itself with the mantle of immunity conferred by 
§ 35-1-60 and is subject to tort claims based upon unsafe working 
conditions in its role as supervisor of the project. 
Plaintiff's position is simple: if an "employer" desires 
to be immune from third-party tort liability, that employer should 
obtain worker's compensation coverage for the employee, whether 
or not that coverage is duplicative. Not only does this assure 
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that benefits will be paid if the employee is injured, but it al£o 
enhances the likelihood that the job will be conducted in a safe 
manner. 
Further, insurance carriers underwrite risks. Insurance 
premiums are paid on the basis of risk, and contracts are awarded 
on the ability of the general contractor to obtain worker's com-
pensation coverage. To relieve an owner or general contractor from 
the onus of obtaining worker's compensation coverage, is to remove 
an important check on that employer's or general contractor's negli-
gence. 
In summary, employers who maintain unsafe workplaces 
would not be subject to common law tort liability, would not be 
required to pay premiums for worker's compensation insurance cover-
age, would not be subject to the 15% surcharge for maintaining an 
unsafe workplace, and would be able to control every action of 
the subcontractor's employees even if that control was conducted 
negligently. 
This result was rejected by the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Thomas v. Farnsworth Chambers, 286 F.2d 270 (10th Cir. 
1960). In that case, the trial court held that since the principal 
contractor would be liable to a subcontractor's injured employees 
for worker's compensation if the subcontractor failed to carry 
insurance, then the employee who received worker's compensation 
benefits could not maintain an action against the principal con-
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tractor for those injuries. The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial 
court and stated as follows: 
We know, of course, that the basic purpose of the 
so-called "statutory employer" provisions in the Worker's 
Compensation Act is to vouchsafe the Act to all employees, 
within their definitive provisions, and to that end to 
prevent evasive action by all those engaged in business 
or enterprise, within their coverage. 
Id. at 273. 
The Tenth Circuit continued holding that where the prin-
cipal contractor is not liable for worker's compensation benefits 
because the actual employer provided the insurance, the principal 
contractor is not exempt from common law liability. In that regard, 
the Court held: 
In other words, where the subcontractor has secured 
compensation for his employees, a general contractor is 
under no statutory liability, and is subject to common 
law liability. 
286 F.2d at 272 (citations omitted). 
In Fonseca v. Pacific Construction, 513 P.2d 156 (Hawaii 
1973), the Hawaii Supreme Court refused to allow the general con-
tractor to claim immunity pursuant to the exclusive remedies pro-
vision where no worker's compensation obligation had been assumed 
by or imposed upon it. In that regard, the Court stated: 
On the facts presented by this case, the necessary 
work relationship for third-party immunity is absent 
or, put another way, there is no quid pro quo. Under 
the statute as we have construed it, the relationship 
comes into existence only when a subcontractor fails to 
provide benefits. 
* * * 
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Therefore, the appellees [general contractors] having 
given nothing, cannot expect complete immunity. 
Id. at 159. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-46 requires all employers to obtain 
worker's compensation insurance for their statutory employees or 
provide sufficient proof of self-insurance to the Industrial Com-
mission. Defendant did neither, and yet, despite the provisions 
of § 35-1-57 which strips the defendant of the cloak of immunity 
for failure to comply with § 35-1-46, claimed immunity in this 
case and received it. The trial court's holding was based upon 
what it deemed to be fairness: since the plaintiff, who was criti-
cally injured because of defendant's negligence, obtained worker's 
compensation benefits from his actual employer, TEAM, it would be 
unfair to expose the defendant to common law tort liability. What 
is truly unfair and flies in the face of not only public policy but 
the policies of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, is to relieve 
a "statutory employer" of its express obligations under the Act 
and yet confer all of the Act's benefits upon it. That is precisely 
what the trial court did. Defendant was required to answer to no 
one for its negligence, including a worker's insurance compensation 
carrier which, presumably, would evaluate defendant's safety record 
and employment practices and charge a worker's compensation insur-
ance premium accordingly. Additionally, by exercising control 
over plaintiff's actual employer, TEAM, defendant qualified as a 
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"statutory employer" and rendered TEAM impotent when it came to 
safety practices. Nevertheless, it was TEAM and its insurer who 
bore the burden of the Worker's Compensation Act. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff submits that "statutory employers" are not 
immune from civil liability in accordance with § 35-1-62. In 
addition, even if the defendant was immune as plaintiff's "statutory 
employer", defendant had to provide insurance or sufficient proof 
of self-insurance pursuant to § 35-1-46 to claim that immunity. 
Defendant failed to comply with § 3 5-1-46 and consequently, § 35-
1-57, which strips employers of immunity who fail to comply with 
§ 35-1-46, was triggered. As a result, the trial court erred as 
a matter of law, in granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and denying plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
this Court should reverse. 
DATED this O day of January, 1988. 
iED R. SILVESTER, Esq. 
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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APPENDIX "A-l" 
35*1-42. Employers enumerated and defined — Regularly 
employed — Independent contractors. 
The following constitute employers subject to the provisions of this title: 
(1) The state, and each county, city, town, and school district in the 
state. 
(2) (a) Every person, firm, and corporation, including every public util-
ity, having in service one or more workmen or operatives regularly 
employed in the same business, or in or about the same establish-
ment, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, 
except: 
(i) agricultural employers: (A) whose employees are all mem-
bers of the immediate family of the employer, which employer 
has a proprietary interest in the farm, the inclusion of any imme-
diate family member under the provisions of this title being at 
the option of the employer; or (B) who employ five or fewer per-
sons other than immediate family members for 40 hours or more 
per week per employee for 13 consecutive weeks during any part 
of the preceding 12 months; and 
(ii) domestic employers who do not employ one employee or 
more than one employee at least 40 hours per week. 
(b) Employers of agricultural laborers and domestic servants have 
the right to come under the terms of this title by complying with the 
provisions of this title and the rules of the commission. 
(3) As used in this section: 
(a) "Regularly" includes all employments in the usual course of the 
trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer, whether 
continuous throughout the year or for only a portion of the year. 
(b) Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly or in 
part for him by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision 
or control, and this work is a part or process in the trade or business 
of the employer, the contractor, all persons employed by him, all 
subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any of these 
subcontractors, are considered employees of the original employer. 
(c) Any person, firm, or corporation engaged in the performance of 
work as an independent contractor is considered an employer, 
(d) "Independent contractor" means any person, association, or cor-
poration engaged in the performance of any work for another who, 
while so engaged, is independent of the employer in all that pertains 
to the execution of the work, is not subject to the rule or control of the 
employer, is engaged only in the performance of a definite job or piece 
of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result 
in accordance with the employer's design. 
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35-1-46. Employers to secure workers9 compensation ben-
efits for employees — Methods — Failure — No-
tice — Injunction — Violation. 
(1) Employers, including counties, cities, towns, and school districts, shall 
secure the payment of workers' compensation benefits for their employees: 
(a) By insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensa-
tion with the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, which payments 
shall commence within 90 days after any final award by the commission; 
(b) By insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensa-
tion with any stock corporation or mutual association authorized to trans-
act the business of workers' compensation insurance in this state, which 
payments shall commence within 90 days after any final award by the 
commission; 
(c) By furnishing annually to the commission satisfactory proof of fi-
nancial ability to pay direct compensation in the amount, in the manner, 
and when due as provided for in this title, which payments shall com-
mence within 90 days after any final award by the commission. In these 
cases the commission may in its discretion require the deposit of accept-
able security, indemnity, or bond to secure the payment of compensation 
liabilities as they are incurred, and may at any time change or modify its 
findings of fact herein provided for, if in its judgment this action is neces-
sary or desirable to secure or assure a strict compliance with all the 
provisions of law relating to the payment of compensation and the fur 
nishing of medical, nurse, and hospital services, medicines, and burial 
expenses to injured employees and to the dependents of killed employees. 
The commission may in proper cases revoke any employer's privilege as a 
self-insurer. 
(2) The commission is authorized and empowered to maintain a suit in any 
court of the state to enjoin any employer, within the provisions of this act, 
from further operation of the employer's business, where the employer has 
failed to provide for the payment of benefits in one of the three ways in this 
section provided. Upon a showing of failure to so provide, the court shall 
enjoin the further operation of the employer's business until the payment of 
these benefits has been secured by the employer as required by this section. 
The court may enjoin the employer without requiring bond from the commis-
sion. 
If the commission has reason to believe that an employer of one or more 
employees is conducting a business without securing the payment of compen-
sation in one of the three ways provided in this section, the commission may 
give such employer five days' written notice by registered mail of such non-
compliance and if the employer within said period does not remedy such de-
fault, the commission may file suit as in this section above provided and the 
court is empowered, ex parte to issue without bond a temporary injunction 
restraining the further operation of the employer's business. 
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35-1-57. noncompliance—Penalty.—Employers who shall fail to comply 
with the provisions of section 35-1-46 shall not be entitled to the benefits of 
this title during the period of noncompliance, but shall be liable in a civil 
action to their employees for damages suffered by reason of personal in-
juries arising out of or in the course of employment caused by the wrongful 
act, neglect or default of the employer or any of the employer's officers, 
agents or employees, and also to the dependents or personal representatives 
of such employees where death results from such injuries. In any such ac-
tion the defendant shall not avail himself of any of the following defenses: 
the defense of ih«* fallow-servant rule, the defense of assumption of risk, 
or the defense of contributory negligence. Proof of the injury shall con-
stitute prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the employer and 
the burden shall be upon the employer to show freedom from negligence re-
sulting in such injury. And such employers shall also be subject to the 
provisions of the two sections next succeeding [35-1-58, 35-1-59]. In any 
civil action permitted under this section against the employer the employee 
shall be entitled to necessary costs and a reasonable attorney fee assessed 
against the employer. 
History: L. 1917, ch, 100, §68; 0. L. 
1917, §3129; B» « "»*3, 424-54; L. 1939, 
cH. 51, § 1; a 1943, 42-1-54; L. 1969, CJL 86, 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1939 amendment substituted "two 
sections next succeeding" for "section next 
succeeding" in the fourth sentence. 
The 1969 amendment added the fifth 
sentence. 
Cro89»neferencs* 
Pe'low servants, 34-23-1 et seq. 
Applicability of section. 
The word "employer** is used in this 
.section i encompass only an employer in 
a situation where the employment status 
is localized in Utah. United Airlines 
Transport Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 110 
U. 590,175 P. 2d 752. 
Election between causes of action. 
Where plaintiff, in his amended com-
plaint, set forth three alternative causes 
of action, the first two in negligence and 
the third under this section and 35-1-46, 
it was reversible error for the lower court 
at the pretrial hearing to require plaintiff 
to make an election between the three 
causes contrary to Rule 8 (e) of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Rosander v. Larscn, 
14 U. (2d) 1, 376 P. 2d 146. 
£xclusivenes8 of remedy. 
The provisions of this section with re-
spect to a uonconiplying- employer afford 
one of the two exceptions to the exclusive 
remedy provision of this title. Otherwise, 
a proceeding under the provisions of this 
act is the sole remedy of the injured em-
ployee. Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash 
Laundry, 108 U. 1, 156 P. 2d 885. 
Failure to furnish annual statement. 
Pact that employer failed to furnish 
industrial commission with annual finan-
cial statement as proof of financial ability 
to pay direct compensation to an injured 
employee did not disqualify employer ns 
self-insurer under 35-1 -46, and did not 
give employee right to maintain civil 
action against employer under this section. 
Lovato v„ Beatrice Foods, 22 U. (2d) 371, 
453 P. 2d 692. 
General construction. 
This section and 35-1-58 cover the same 
elements and arc intended to save to the 
employee his common-law civil right of 
action againnt. the employer who has failed 
to comply. Pfterson v. Sorensen, 91 U. 
507, 65 P. 2d 12. 
Nothing in Workmen's Compensation 
Act permits plaintiff, in action against 
employer who did not carry compensation 
ieBsmran*f» nml hnd not nunlifieri a s A *«lf-
iusurer for injury based on employer's 
claimed negligence, to recover cither for 
negligence not charged or charged but not 
proved. Peterson v. Sorensen, 91 U. 507, 
65 P. 2d 12. 
This section contemplates that proceed-
ings to recover compensation for injuries 
shall be brought against the employer. A 
workman may not disregard the actual em-
ployer and recover against an agency or 
person because such agency or person 
furnishes the funds for financing the em-
ployment undertaking. Buhlcr v. Mnddi-
sou, 105 U. 39, 140 P. 2d 933, 109 U. 245, 
166 P. 2d 205, 109 U. 267, 176 P. 2d 118, 
168 A. L. IL 177. 
Collateral References. 
Workmen's Com pen sat ion 0 2 1 1 0 . 
101 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensa t ion 
§917. 
Bringing action against employer ns 
election or estoppel precluding claim for 
compensation, 94 A. L. R. 1430. 
Constitutionality of Workmen's Compen-
sation Act giving choice of remedies ex-
clusivelv to cither employer or employee, 
6 A . L R . 1562. 
Right of employee who has not received 
award under Workmen's Compensation Act 
to maintain action against physician for 
m Ataractics 154 A- Lu R_ 315. 
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36-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, agent or em-
ployee—Occupational disease excepted,—The right to recover compensa-
tion pursuant to the provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an 
employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy 
against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy against any officer, 
agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the employer im-
posed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil liability 
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such employee or to hL» 
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal 
representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of 
any accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggra-
vated or incurred by such employee in the course of or because of or 
arising out of his employment, and no action at law may be maintained 
against an employer or against any officer, agent or employee of the 
employer based upon any accident, injury or death of an employee. 
Nothing in this section, however, shall prevent an employee (or his de-
pendents) from filing a claim with the industrial commission of Utah for 
compensation in those cases within the provisions of the Utah Occupational 
Disease Disability Act, as amended. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, §76, 0. I*, strued to mean an aet done knowingly 
1917, §3132; L. 1921, en. 67, § 1; B. 8. and purposely with the direct object ot 
1933 * 0.1943, 42-1-57; L. 1949, ch. 52, § 1. injuring another." 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment rewrote this sec-
tion, which read: "The right to recover 
compensation pursuant to the provisions 
of this title for injuries sustained by an 
employee, whether resulting in death or 
not, shall be the exclusive remedy against 
the employer except as in this title other-
wise declared; provided, that where the 
injury is caused by the employer's willful 
misconduct and the act causing such in-
jury is the personal act of the employer 
himself, or, if the employer is a partner-
ship, of one of the partners, or if a 
corporation, of an elective officer or offi-
cers thereof, and such act indicates will-
ful disregard of the life, limb or bodily 
safety of employees, such injured employee 
or other person damaged may, at his op-
tion, either claim compensation unde - this 
title or maintain an action at law for 
damages. The term 'willful misconduct,' 
as employed in this section shall be con-
Croas-Beferencea. 
Employment ot children, 34-23-1 et seq. 
Utah Occupational Disease Disability 
Law, 35-2-1 et seq. 
Compulsory. 
Utah Workmen's Compensation Act is 
compulsory and not elective. Lovato v. 
Beatrice Poods, 22 U. (2d) 371, 453 P. 2d 
692. 
Excluaiveness of remedy. 
Under this section when the injury is 
caused by the negligent act of the employ-
er, no willful misconduct being claimed, 
the injured employee or, when the injury 
causes death, his dependents, must be 
content to accept the compensation pro-
vided by the act. Hailing v. Industrial 
Comm., 71 U. 112, 263 P. 78. 
Since the enactment of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act in 1917, the exclusive 
remedy of an employee who is injured in 
the course of his employment is the right 
to recover the compensation provided for 
in the act (35-1-1 et seq.). Murray v. 
Wasatch Grading Co., 73 U. 430, 274 P. 
940; Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash 
Laundry, 108 IT. 1, 156 P. 2d 885. 
Employee of railroad was not precluded 
from filing claim for compensa t ion by 
application filed under Federal Employers' 
Liability Act on ground of election since 
employee did not have two remedies but 
only one; if injury was incurred while he 
was engaged in interstate commerce, his 
remedy was under Federal E m p l o y e r s ' 
Liability Act and if not, it was under 
state act. Utah Idaho Cent. B. Co. v. 
Industrial Comm., 84 U. 364, 35 P. 2d 
842, 94 A. L. B. 1423. 
This section abrogates employee's com-
mon-law right to sue employer for in-
juries suffered while in course of em-
ployment, except where employer is not 
subject to this act or common-law remedy 
of employee is expressly reserved. Masich 
v. United States Smelting, Refining <fe 
Mining Co., 113 U. 101, 191 P. 2d 612. 
Where minor's employment at time of 
his death was not illegal this section rend-
ered remedy under Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act exclusive, and wrongful-death 
action could not be maintained, even prior 
to adoption of 35-1-61. Henrie v. Bocky 
Mountain Packing Corp., 113 U. 415, 196 
P. 2d 487. 
Fanners and domestics. 
Farm laborers and domestic servants, 
in the event of an accident or injury, 
are entitled to pursue their common-law 
remedies in an action against the em-
ployer because they are excepted from 
the act by 35-1-42 and 35-1-43. Murray 
v. Strike, 76 U. 118, 287 P. 922. 
Joint venture. 
Construction company obtained contract 
to construct diversion tunnel at dam and 
entered into agreement with corporation 
by which the two organizations would 
unite their efforts to complete such con-
struction and share in profits or losses 
from the enterprise. Miner, hired by the 
construction company, who was injured 
while working on the tunnel and who ob-
tained workmen's compensation benefits, 
could not sue corporation for alleged 
negligence of corporate employees since 
the two companies were regarded as the 
employing unit. The employees of both 
companies were engaged in the same em-
ployment. Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 
15 U. (2d) 20, 386 P. 2d 616, distinguished 
in 267 Fo Supp. 411. 
This section barred suit by workman 
against joint venturer which was his em-
ployer for injuries sustained in use of 
machine furnished by a second joint ven-
turer, where machine was furnished pur-
suant to contract creating the joint ven-
ture. Hammer v. Gibbons & Beed Co., 29 
U. (2d) 415, 510 P. 2d 1104. 
Nature and adequacy of act. 
The workmen's compensation scheme is 
purely statutory, and the act (35-1-1 et 
seq.) provides a plain, speedy, and ade-
quate method of review. Woldberg v. In-
dustrial Comm., 74 U. 309, 279 P. 609. 
Negligent injury by employee of same 
employer. 
Where subcontractor was an "employee" 
of contractor, other employee of contractor 
could not maintain negligence action a-
gainst subcontractor but must look to 
workmen's compensation insurance. Gal-
legos v. Stringham, 21 U. (2d) 139, 442 P. 
2d 31. 
Occupational disease. 
Administratrix of deceased city em-
ployee, who died from inhalation of paint 
he was ordered to spray on trucks, could 
bring an action at law against the em-
ployer, since such was not an accidental 
injury compensable under this act (35-1-1 
et seq.), but was an "occupational dis-
ease.79 Young v. Salt Lake City, 97 U. 
123, 90 P. 2d 174. 
Subcontractor's employee. 
Subcontractor's employee could not re-
cover from general contractor in civil ac-
tion for injuries on theory that subcon-
tractor was his employer and general 
contractor was a third person not in the 
same employment. Smith ve Alfred Brown 
Co., 27 U. (2d) 155, 493 P. 2d 994. 
This section does not forbid or render 
invalid a clause in a constructon subcon-
tract by which the subcontractor agreed 
to indemnify the prime contractor and 
save him harmless for all liability arising 
out of the injury or death of an employee 
of subcontractor, where such clause ex-
isted and decedent workman's adminis-
tratrix sued prime contractor for wrong-
ful death of decedent and recovered; 
therefore, decedent's employer is required 
to reimburse prime contractor COT )red by 
workmen's compensation as proT ded in 
such indemnity clause. Titan Steel Corp. 
v. Walton, 365 F. 2d 542. 
Collateral References. 
Workmen's Compensation^»2084. 
101 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensat ion 
§918. 
- Applicability of state compensation act 
to injury within admiralty jurisdiction, 
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35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of per-
sons other than employer, officer, agent, or em-
ployee of said employer — Rights of employer or 
insurance carrier in cause of action — Mainte-
nance of action — Notice of intention to proceed 
against third party — Right to maintain action 
not involving employee-employer relationship — 
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery. 
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this 
title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other 
than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer, the injured 
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the 
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an 
action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and 
the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the 
employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause »Z action 
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its 
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal 
representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not 
settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission. 
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee, or, in case of 
death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the carrier or 
other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order to give such 
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding. 
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of sec-
tion 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may 
also maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contrac-
tors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not 
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased 
employee at the time of his injury or death. 
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as 
follows: 
(1) The rea& mable • xpense of the action, including attorneys' fees, 
shall be paid and chained proportionately against the parties as their 
interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the employer or carrier 
is to be a credi upon a ly fee payable by the injured employee or, in the 
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the third 
party. 
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed 
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and 
attorneys' fees provided for in subsection (1). 
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in 
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation 
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation. 
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35-1-107. Uninsured Employers9 Fund — Creation — Lia-
bility — Funding — Administration — Subroga-
tion — Insolvent employer — Fund's rights with 
wrongful act or neglect — Adjusting claims — 
Penalty — Assessment of self-insured employers 
— Duty to notify. 
(1) There is created an Uninsured Employers' Fund for the purpose of pay-
ing and assuring, to persons entitled to workers' compensation benefits when 
every employer of the claimant who is found to be individually, jointly, or 
severally liable becomes or is insolvent, appoints or has appointed a receivei, 
or otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or other secu-
rity to cover workers' compensation liabilities under this chapter. This fund 
succeeds to all monies previously held in the Default Indemnity Fund. If it 
becomes necessary to pay benefits, the fund is liable for all obligations of the 
employer as set forth in Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35, with the exception of 
penalties on those obligations. 
(2) Funds for the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall be provided under Sub-
section 59*9-101(2). The state treasurer is the custodian of the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund and the commission shall direct its distribution. Reasonable 
costs of administration may be paid from the fund. The commission shall 
employ counsel to represent the Uninsured Employers' Fund in all proceed-
ings brought to enforce claims against or on behalf of the fund, and upon the 
request of the commission, the attorney general, city attorney, or county at-
torney of the locality in which any investigation, hearing, or trial under the 
provisions of this title is pending, or in which the employee resides or an 
employer resides or is doing business, shall aid in the representation of the 
fund. 
(3) To the extent of the compensation and other benefits paid or payable to 
or on behalf of an employee or their dependents from the Uninsured Em-
ployers' Fund, the fund, by subrogation, has all the rights, powers, and bene-
fits of the employee or their dependents against the employer failing to make 
the compensation payments. 
(4) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory successor of an insolvent 
employer is bound by settlements of covered claims by the fund. The court 
having jurisdiction shall grant all payments made under this section a prior-
ity equal to that to which the claimant would have been entitled in the ab-
sence of this section against the assets of the insolvent employer. The ex-
penses of the fund in handling claims shall be accotded the same priority as 
the liquidator's expenses. 
(5) The commission shall periodically file with the receiver, trustee, or liq-
uidator of the insolvent employer or insurance carrier statements of the cov-
ered claims paid by the fund and estimates of anticipated claims against the 
fund which shall preserve the rights of the fund for claims against the c^sets 
of the insolvent employer. 
(6) When any injury or death for which compensation ic payable from the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund has been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another person not in the same employment, the fund has the same rights as 
allowed under § 35-1-62. 
(7) The fund, subject to approval of the Workers' Compensation Division of 
the Industrial Commission, shall discharge its obligations by adjusting its 
own claims or by contracting with an adjusting company, risk management 
company, insurance company, or other company that has expertise and capa-
bilities in adjusting and paying workers' compensation claims. 
(8) For the purpose of maintaining this funH, the commission, upon render-
ing a decision with respect to any claim for benefits under this chapter, shall 
impose a penalty against the uninsured employer of 15% of the value of the 
total award in connection with the claim, and shall direct that the additional 
penalty be paid into the Uninsured Employers' Fund. Awards may be dock-
eted as other awards under this chapter. 
(9) The liability of the stale, the Industrial Commission, and the state trea-
surer, with respf ct to payment of any compensation benefits, expenses, fees, 
or disbursement properly chargeable against the fund, is limited to the assets 
in the fund, and they are not otherwise in any way liable for the making of 
any payment. 
(10) The commission may make reasonable rules for the processing and 
payment of claims for compensation from the fund. 
(11) In the event it becomes necessary for the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
to pay benefits under this section to any employee of an insolvent self-insured 
employer, the Uninsured Employers' Fund may assess all other self-insured 
employers amounts necessary to pay (a) the obligations of the fund subse-
quent to an insolvency, (b) the expenses of handling covered claims subse-
quent to an insolvency, (c) the cost of examinations under Subsection (12), and 
(d) other expenses authorized by this section. The assessments of each self-
insured employer shall be in the proportion that the manual premium of the 
self-insured employer for the preceding calenaai year bears to the manual 
premium of all self-insured employers for the preceding calendar year. Each 
self-insured employer shall be notified of his assessment not later than 30 
days before it is due. No self-insured employer may be assessed in any year an 
amount greater than 2% of that self-insured employer's manual premium for 
the preceding calendar year. If the maximum assessment does not provide in 
any one year an amount sufficient to make all necessary payments from the 
fund for one or more insolvent self-insured employers, the unpaid portion 
shall be paid as soon as funds become available. All self-insured employers are 
liable under this section for a period not to exceed three years after the self-
insured employer's voluntary or involuntary termination of self-insurance 
privileges within thij state. This subsection does not apply to claims made 
against an insolvent self-insured employer if the insolvency occurred prior to 
July 1, 1986. 
(12) It is the duty of all self-insured employers to notify the Industrial 
Commission of any information indicating that any self-insured employer 
may be insolvent or in a financial condition hazardous to its employees or the 
public. Upon receipt of that notification and with good cause appearing, the 
Industrial Commission may order an examination of that self-insured em-
ployer. The cost of the examination shall be assessed against all self-insured 
employers as provided in Subsection (11). The ~o«its of the examination shall 
be kept confidential. 
History: C. 1953, 35-1-107, enacted by L. 
1964, ch. 77, § 1; 1986, ch. 211, § 12; 1987, 
ch. 2, § 35; 1987, ch. 126, § 4. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1986 amendment, 
effective July 1, 1986, in Subsection (1) substi-
tuted "Uninsured Employers' Fund" for "De-
fault Indemnity Fund" wherever it appears; in-
serted "of the claimant who is found to be indi-
vidually, jointly, or severally liable" before 
"becomes" and inserted "or is" after "becomes" 
in the first sentence, inserted the second sen-
tence, added "with the exception of penalties 
on those obligations" at the end of the last sen-
tence, and made minor word changes; in Sub-
section (2) added "and 31A-3-20H2)" at the end 
of the first sentence, substituted "commission'* 
for " lorney general", substituted "employ 
counsel" for "appoint a member of his staff, 
added "and upon the request of the commis-
sion, ne attorney general, city attorney, or 
count, attorney of the locality in which any 
investigation, hearing, or trial under the provi-
sions of this title is pending, or in which the 
employee resides or an employer resides or is 
doing business, shall aid in the representation 
of the fund," at the end of the fourth sentence, 
and made stylistic changes; made stylistic 
changes in Subsections (3), (4), (7), and (10); in 
the first sentence of Subsection (8) deleted 
"from the Default Indemnity Fund" following 
"claim," substituted "benefits" for "compensa-
tion" following "for", inserted "uninsured" be-
fore "employer" and "value of the" before 
"total", deleted "made" following "award", in-
serted "in connection with" following "in", and 
inserted "Uninsured Employers'" before 
"Fund"; and added Subsections (11) and (12). 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 2, effec-
tive February 6, 1987, in Subsection (2) substi-
tuted "Subsections 35-l-68(2)(a) and 
59-9-101(2)" for "Subsections 35-l-68(2)(a) and 
31A-3-201". 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 208, effec-
tive July 1, 1987, in Subsection (2), in the first 
sentence substitued "under Subsection 
31A-3-20K2)" for "pursuant to Subsections 
35-l-68(2)(a) and 31A-3-20K2)." 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
ch. 2, § 331 provides: "This act has retrospec-
tive operation to January 1, 1987." 
Cited in Cariucci v. Utah State Indus. 
Comm'n & Default Indem. Fund, 725 P.2d 
1335 (Utah 1986). 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIMOTHY R. BOSCH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s , 
BUSCH DEVELOPMENT, I N C . , 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-84-5499 
Before the Court is the defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and the plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. The Motions were briefed and argued at separate times. 
At the hearing on the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
depositions were published pursuant to request and without 
objection. The depositions have been filed in case No. C-84-
4456, which case has been included in the pleadings of this case 
in accordance with Judge Wilkinson's Order of June 26, 198 6. The 
parties appeared and argued their respective positions, and the 
Court took the matters under advisement to further consider the 
issues raised during the course of oral argument, and in the 
parties respective Memoranda of Points and Authorities. The 
Court has now had an opportunity to review the issues raised, 
consider the arguments of counsel, both oral and written, and 
being otherwise fully advised, enters the following Memorandum 
Decision. 
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DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant claims it is entitled to Summary Judgment on the 
basis that it is the statutory employer of the plaintiff, and as 
such plaintiff's exclusive remedy with respect to the defendant 
are the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act barring the 
plaintiff's negligence claim. 
Plaintiff asserts that the defendant is not the statutory 
eirpr.oyer of the plaintiff, because there is not the requisite 
supervision and control, and that the work in question is n^t a 
part of the defendant's trade or business. Plaintiff further 
alleges that even if the defendant was the plaintiff's statutory 
employer, the amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Act in 
19 75 removes the statutory employer from the exclusivity 
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
Both sides in this controversy have filed extensive briefs 
in which the applicable cases and the arguments are clearly 
enunciated. This Court resists the temptation to opine at great 
length on what the attorneys in this case have already addressed. 
Suffice it to say that the Court finds that the proper legal 
position is that espoused by the defendant on the question of 
whether or not the 1975 amendment to the Workmen's Compensation 
Act took away the defense of exclusive remedy for a statutory 
employer. While it is difficult to square with prior Utah 
Supreme Court decisions, a fair reading of the majority in the 
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case of Hinds v, Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d 561 (Utah 
1978), leaves no other conclusion. Therefore, this Court holds 
that if the defendant falls into the status of a "statutory 
employer," then the defendants Motion for Summary Judgment must 
be granted. 
On that issue, the plaintiff argues there are at least two 
areas where there are significant questions of fact on the 
statutory employer issue. Initially, the plaintiff claims tnat 
there are questions of fact on the issue of supervision and 
control, and secondly that there are issues of fact remaining for 
determination as to whether or not the work being performed was 
in the trade or business of the defendant. 
At first blush, questions of fact seem to be present. 
However, upon closer examination in light of the Supreme Court 
pronouncements on the subject, no disputed material issue of fact 
exists on either the question of supervision or control, or 
whether or not the work is in the trade or business of the 
defendant. The supervision and control aspects of the 
relationship between the defendant and plaintiff, and the 
plaintiff's direct employer are set out in paragraph 6 of the 
defendant's initial Memoranda, and are properly identified to the 
record. Plaintiff's comments and response, in reality, do not 
change those existing relationships. Plaintiff applies the 
incorrect standard to evaluate the facts. See, Bennett v. 
BOSCH V, BUSCH DEV. PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). It is 
without dispute that defendant as general contractor retained 
ultimate control of the project. In fact, in relation to the 
plaintiff and the plaintiff's direct employer, the control on 
occasion by the defendant was direct to the plaintiff and his 
fellow employees. 
As indicated earlier, it also appears that as a matter of 
law, the nature of the work being performed by the plaintiff and 
his co-employees for his direct employer was a part of the 
process in the trade or business of the defendant. The test is 
not whether or not the defendant could or could not install 
decorative rock panels, but rather the issue is whether or not 
the rock panels were part of the overall project of building the 
structure in question. Anything that goes toward the completion 
of the overall project, which is defendant's business as general 
contractor, is part of the general contractor's business. See, 
Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 493 P.2d 994 (Utah 1972), and Adamson 
v. Okland Construction Co., 508 P.2d 805 (Utah 1973). 
The defendant has clearly met the two step test to determine 
the existence of a statutory employer relationship to the 
plaintiff. 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant is protected from suit 
by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act, and the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
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PLAINTIFF fS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
the basi^ that if the defendant's claims of status as statutory 
employer are correct, then because the defendant did not itself 
provide workmen's compensation insurance, defendant is still 
subject to suit under the provisions of Section 35-1-57 of the 
Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended. 
In this case the defendant contracted with its subcontractor 
and plaintiff's direct employer for the direct employer to 
provide proper workmen's compensation insurance. The plaintiff's 
direct employer, in fact, did that and the plaintiff has received 
the benefits of that insurance. The defendant did not obtain a 
separate but duplicative insurance policy to provide the same 
insurance coverage. The defendant as statutory employer may 
have been responsible under the provisions of Section 35-1-57, 
Utah Code Ann., if the plaintiff's direct employer had failed to 
procure workmen's compensation insurance, but that situation does 
not exist in the present setting, and that issue is not decided 
here. The purpose and intent of the Workmen's Compensation Act 
is to, among other things, insure that workmen's compensation 
insurance and benefits are provided to the various individual 
workmen. The defendant by contract with the plaintiff's direct 
employer did in fact insure that the plaintiff had workmen's 
compensation insurance. The plaintiff, as far as workmen's 
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compensation insurance, has received everything that he is 
entitled to receive, and cannot be heard to say that because the 
statutory employer did not purchase duplicative coverage, that 
the plaintiff may still maintain a civil suit against the 
defendant. 
Accordingly, the plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment is denied. 
Counsel for the defendant is to prepare an appropriate Order 
granting the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and denying 
the plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and submit 
the same to the Court in accordance with the Local Rules of 
Practice for the Court's review and signature. 
Dated this _day of September, 1987. 
1^1 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
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BY ,- U-Ct: A-^L. •: DeeaW1 Clen 
IN,THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TIMOTHY R. BOSCH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BUSCH DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C84-5499 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment, came for 
hearing before the court on July 19, 1987. Defendant was 
represented by William W. Barrett and Robert. H. Rees of the 
firm of the Kipp and Christian, P.C. and plaintiff was 
represented by Fred R. Silvester of the firm of Suitter, Axland, 
Armstrong and Hanson. Plaintiff's motion for partial summary 
judgment came on for hearing before the court on September 
28, 1987. Plaintiff was represented by Fred R. Silvester 
of the firm of Suitter, Axland, Armstrong and Hanson and 
defendant was represented by Robert H. Rees of the firm of 
Kipp and Christian, P.C. The court heard the argument of 
counsel regarding both defendant's motion for summary judgment 
and plaintiff?s motion for partial summary judgment and took 
both matters under advisement. The court has considered the 
various memoranda filed by the parties with respect to both 
motions and being fully advised in the premises and good cause 
appearing, hereby orders as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment 
is hereby denied. 
2. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby 
granted and summary judgment is entered for 
defendant againsi 
DATED This ^IP^ay of Octq6er% 1987, 
rr.ttTTFICAT*'. H7 MAILING 
,H this $f~ day of September, 
MAILED, postage prepaid, this CGL-
«-F thP Order; to the following: 
1987, a true and correct copy of the Order, 
Fred R. Silvester 
^^,
P
AxS:°AP f IBONO, HANSON 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
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WILLIAM W. BARRETT (#A0229) 
ROBERT H- REES (#A04125) 
KIPP ANO CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
ATTORNCYS rom D e f e n d a n t 
6 0 0 COMMERCIAL CCU» BUILDING 
SALT LAKC CITY. UTAH 64111 
(601) 321-3773 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIMOTHY R. BOSCH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BUSCH DEVELOPMENT, INC. 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-84-5499 
Judge David B. Dee 
Defendant Busch Development, Inc. (Busch) submits this 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On December 1, 1981, Busch was engaged as owner, 
developer and general contractor in the construction of Busch 
Park, Phase III, a commercial office complex located in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. (Complaint, 1 4; Answer, 11 4; Busch Affida-
vit, 11 3). 
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2. Busch had subcontracted with Thermal Energy Ama] 
gama~ted Manufacturing Corporation (TEAM) for the manufacture ar 
installation of aggregate rock "crystall panels11 on a buildir 
involved in Phase III. (Sherman depo., p. 7; Exhibit "1" t 
Powell depo.). 
3. Plaintiff Timothy R. Bosch was one of severa 
individuals employed by TEAM to install the panels. (Bosc 
depo., pp. 4, 7, 8; Complaint, 1 3K 
4. During the course of the Busch Park Phase II 
construction project, James Arthur Sherman (Sherman) was employ 
ed by Busch as construction superintendent and was engaged full 
time as supervisor of the project for Busch. (Sherman depo., p 
4; Yannacone depo., p. 33). 
5. Busch was incorporated on May 2, 1977 for th 
purpose of conducting business as a general contractor as wel 
as buying, owning, developing and leasing real property. Busc 
conducts its general contracting business under a license i^sue 
by the Department of Business Regulation of the State of Utah 
(Busch Affidavit, 11 2). 
6. Sherman, as Buschfs representative, engaged i 
the following acts of control over TEAM and TEAM'S employees 
Sherman was responsible for the subcontractors in respect t 
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virtually all facets (Powell depo., p. 24); Sherman had the 
authority to discharge people from the job if they were not 
within the limits of good construction practices (Powell depo., 
p. 24); Sherman was Busch's representative from whom TEAMfs 
employees requested equipment to assist in installing the panels 
(Yannacone depo., pp. 18, 26, 33> 54-56); TEAM'S general manager 
in charge of the Busch Park job dealt with Sherman with regard 
to any problems he had on the project (Yannacone depo., pp. 11 
and 26); when the TEAM employees first went to the Busch Park 
job site, Sherman took them around the building and directed 
them where the panels had to go (Bosch depo., p. 9); Sherman 
directed the TEAM employees who had not previously been wearing 
hard hats to wear hard hats on the job and, pursuant to that 
direction, TEAM employees went to their own supervisors and 
acquired hard hats (Bosch depo., pp. 31 and 32); the day before 
the accident, Sherman directed the TEAM employees to complete 
the north door entrance way and, pursuant to that directive, 
TEAM employees were, at the time of the accident, attempting to 
do so (Bosch depo., p. 32). 
7. On December 1, 1981, while engaged in his employ-
ment with regard to the Busch Park Phase III project, plaintiff 
fell from a beam in the building on the construction site and 
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received personal injuries (Complaint, H 3 and 6; Bosch depo. 
pp. 32-40). 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Resolution of Buschfs Motion requires consideration o 
provisions of Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act. The Utah Su 
preme Court has stated that the Act should be liberally con 
strued, regardless of whether the employee is seeking recover 
under the Act or is seeking to avoid its exclusive remedy pro 
vision. This principle was stated by the Utah Supreme Court a 
follows: 
"The general rule, which has been approved 
by this court a number of times is that the 
act should be liberally construed to ef-
fectuate its purpose of providing protec-
tion to employees. It would be quite in-
consistent with our ideas of even-handed 
justice to apply a liberal interpretation 
of the Act in order to assure coverage to 
employees, but if it appears that there is 
other coverage, to then reverse the policy 
and apply a restrictive view to exclude 
coverage in order to allow an employee to 
sue an employer. We think the ends of 
justice will best be served and the bene-
ficial purposes of the Act will be best 
accomplished for employees and employers 
alike, if the statute is applied in an 
uniform manner, whoever!s rights may be at 
stake." Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 493 
P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 1972). 
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BUSCH IS PLAINTIFF'S STATUTORY 
EMPLOYER. PLAINTIFF'S EXCLUSIVE 
REMEDY IS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. 
This case involves a negligence action against the 
general contractor/owner (Busch) by an individual (plaintiff, 
who had been hired by Busch's subcontractor (TEAM). Pursuant tc 
the "statutory employer" provision (UCA § 35-1-42(3)(b)) of 
Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act (UCA § 35-1-1 et. seq.), Busct 
is plaintiff's statutory employer. Plaintiff's sole remedy for 
injuries received from Busch's alleged negligence, therefore, is 
that provided by Workmen's Compensation. 
UCA § 35-1-60 provides that the "right to recover 
compensation pursuant to the provisions of [the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act] for injuries sustained by an employee... shall be 
the exclusive remedy against the employer...and the liabilities 
of the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and 
all other civil liability whatsoever..." If Busch is plain-
tiff's employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act, then 
plaintiff's exclusive remedy is that provided by the Act. 
The section of the act which defines those employers 
subject to the Act is UCA § 35-1-42. That section generally 
defines an employer as a person, firm or corporation having in 
service one or more workmen or operatives regularly employed in 
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the same business. That section also contains a "statutoi 
employer11 provision which provides as follows: 
n(b) Where any employer procures any work 
to be done wholly or in part for him by a 
contractor over whose work he retains su-
pervision or control, and this work is a 
part or process in the trade or business of 
the employer, the contractor, all persons 
employed by him, all subcontractors under 
him, and all persons employed by any of 
these subcontractors, are considered em-
ployees of jthe original employer.11 (Em-
phasis added). 
"[This section] is a legislatively created scheme by which cor 
ceded non-employees are deliberately brought within the coveraj 
of the [Workmenfs Compensation] Act." Pinter Construction CQE 
pany v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305 (Utah 1984) quoting Young v. Eg 
vironmental Air Products, 665 P.2d 40, 43 (Ariz. 1983). 
This "statutory employer" provision contemplates 
two-fold test to determine whether a contractor and its emplo] 
ees are to be regarded as employees of the original employer fc 
workmen fs compensation purposes. Utah Fire Clay Co. v. Indus 
trial Commission, 40 P.2d 183, 184 (Utah 1935). That two-fo! 
test asks (1) whether the work is a part or process in the trac 
or business of the employer and, (2) whether the employer r< 
tains supervision or control over the work of the contractoi 
Those two questions will be addressed below in that order. 
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1. PART OR PROCESS IN THE TRADE OR BUSINESS OF EMPLOYER, 
In the case of Pinter Construction Co, v. Frisby, 
supra, the Utah Supreme Ccurt outlined the standards by which 
the first element of the two-fold test may be evaluated. The 
Court stated as follows: 
"The phrase ['part or process in the trade 
or business1] includes 'those operations 
which entered directly into the successful 
performance_ of the commercial function of 
the principal employer1 and covers 'all 
situations in which the contracted work is 
such a part of the constructive employer's 
regular business operation as he would 
ordinarily accomplish with his own employ-
ees.'" Id, at p. 309 (Citations omitted). 
As indicated above, Busch's trade or business is that 
of a general contractor and includes buying, owning, developing, 
and leasing real property. Busch is licensed by the State of 
Utah as a general contractor and was incorporated for the pur-
pose of, among other things, developing real property. 
The work Busch hired TEAM to perform was precisely the 
type of work which was part of Busch's regular business opera-
tion and was such as Busch would ordinarily accomplish with its 
own employees. The work TEAM was performing "entered directly 
into the successful performance" of Buschfs commercial function. 
Accordingly, the first element of the two-fold test is satis-
fied. 
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2. SUPERVISION OR CONTROL, 
The second element of the two-ford test asks whethe 
Busch retained supervision or control over TEAM. The case 
dealing with this question have not produced any definite 
standard by which to determine when the requisite control 
present to meet this part of the test. However, the Utah Si 
preme Court case of Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisby, supr; 
supports the conclusion that Busch exercised sufficient contrc 
over TEAM to satisfy the requirements of the "control11 elemei 
of the two-fold test. 
In Pinter, Frisby was an employee of a subcontract 
who was hired to perform the metal erection portion of a stru< 
ture that Pinter, as general contractor, was building. Frist 
fell from a scaffolding while installing setal siding and subs* 
quently applied to the Industrial Commission for a hearing 1 
determine his entitlement to workmenfs compensation benefit* 
The Industrial Commission held that Frisby was a statutory ei 
ployee of Pinter and was entitled to benefits. Pinter and tl 
State Insurance Fund sought reversal of the Industrial Commi: 
sionfs order. 
Using the two-fold test, the Court upheld the Indu; 
trial Commissions decision awarding ¥orkmen's compensati< 
benefits to Frisby. As to the control element of the two-fo 
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test, the Court found that Pinter retained the requisite super-
vision or control by directing Frisby to get on with the work 
and expressing concern about the deadline for finishing the job, 
and also by maintaining some control over the materials used on 
the job. Id, at p. 309. 
Similar and even more extensive acts of control were 
exercised by Busch over TEAM. Those acts of control are enumer-
ated in paragraph 6 of the Statement of Facts, above. The con-
trol exercised by Busch over TEAM was such that the second ele-
ment of the two-fold test is satisfied. 
Both elements of the two-fold test are satisfied. 
Accordingly, Busch is plaintiff's statutory employer and plain-
tiff's exclusive remedy is that provided by the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, defendant Busch Develop-
ment, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. 
DATED this l*j V^ day of December, 1986. 
KIPP J$V CHRISTIAN, 2.Z. 
[LLIAM W. BARRETT 
ROBERT H. REES 
-9-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
MAILED, postage prepaid, this c^ f day of Decembei 
1986, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandi 
in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 1 
the following: 
Fred R, Silvester 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South -West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
0 ™ 
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APPENDIX "E" 
FRED R. SILVESTER, Esq. (#3862) 
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq. (#4658) 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Timothy R. Bosch 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TIMOTHY R. BOSCH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
BUSCH DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
Defendant. ] 
| MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND | AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF | MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
> SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. C 84-5499 
i Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
STATEMENT OF THE MOTION 
Defendant Busch Park has previously moved the Court 
for summary judgment requesting that it be declared the statutory 
employer of the plaintiff, Timothy Bosch• This Motion is made 
for purposes of having the Court declare that if Busch Park is 
statutory employer of the plaintiff Bosch, because of its non-
compliance with the Worker's Compensation Act, plaintiff is en-
titled to all the benefits of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-57. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Defendant had not secured compensation coverage 
- • .*? ' - r\r ' ;ees pursuant to the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann, .  ---- (Powell Deposition, -o 
Exhibit 1, p. 6; Strong Deposition, Exhibit _, ^ *.--i Exhibit 
ARGUMENT 
In defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, J. t" ?LiiTed 
that under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42(2) it 
q 11 d ], i f i ed a L• <I I * L a t u t o i , e mp J i j y e i JJe c a j s e i ti r e t a i ned :J 11 \ \ e r"/1 s i o in 
and control over the work of TEAM Corporation and the work done 
by TEAM Corporation was a part or process i.n the trade or business 
of Busch Park. 
Should the Court determine that Busch Park was in fact 
an employer; nnaeA0 rjifr < tei in it ion of r.h^  wor tcer * :«,  < 'n'jirifjf'iisaf' i nn 
Act, the employer then is charged with certain duties under the 
Act. 
1. The employer must secure compensation 1: y : 
(a) Insuring with the State Insurance Fund; 
(b) El;; f :i nsi iri i ig wi tli a pri ^  /"ate stock: cor j >c i- • 
ration or a mutual association authorized to transact 
the business of worker f s compensation in the State of 
Utah; or by 
(c) By furnishing annually to the Industrial 
Commission proof of financial ability to pay direct 
compensation. 
See Utah Code Ann, § 35-1-46. 
In addition, an employer must file with the Industrial 
Commission notice of insurance and contractors or policies of 
insurance covering the specific employees. See Utah Code Ann. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-57 as follows: 
Employers who shall fail to comply with the 
provisions of § 35-1-46 shall not be entitled 
to the benefits of this title during the 
period of non-compliance, but shall be liable 
in a civil action to their employees for 
damages suffered by reason of personal in-
juries arising out of or in the course of 
employment caused by the wrongful act, neglect 
or default of the employer or any of the 
employer's officers, agents or employees, 
and also to the dependents or personal repre-
sentatives of such employees where death 
results from such injuries. In such action 
the defendant shall not avail himself of 
any of the following defenses: the defense 
of the fellow servant rule, the defense of 
assumption of risk, or the defense of con-
tributory negligence. Proof of the injury 
shall constitute prima facie evidence of 
negligence on the part of the employer and 
the burden shall be upon the employer to 
show freedom from negligence resulting in 
such injury. And such employer shall also 
be subject to the provisions of the two sec-
tions next succeeding. In any civil action 
permitted under this section against the 
employer, the employee shall be entitled to 
necessary costs and a reasonable attorney's 
fee assessed against the employer. 
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Because of defendarr *.:/:..- I :r 
Summary Judgment that it is a statutory employer 'ne plaintiff, 
] K^r*' r - - declaring the pro-
visions of i 3 5-1-57 applicable ~ <-> *-:< * * +*Ke ^^se I n this 
action and specifically striking any defenses for comparative 
fan... wn. the part of the plaintiff , u. ent. i L.UM1 I-. 
this relief because Busch has failed to comply with the coverage 
Utah Code Ann, k 3r:i I • 4 6 
/v 
*TED thJft / / da > o f Auqu'it , I "H"' . DATED 
SIR, Esq. 
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq. 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Timothy Bosch 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing Memorandum of Poin^* and Authorities. ,
 A • 
in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to be mailed, 
pujjLayy pgepaid fchegcon, this ^ / day of August, 1987, to: £ 
William W. Barrett, Esq. 
Robert H. Rees, Esq. 
KIPP and CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-23: 
^ 
(FRS7.16) 
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Fred R. Si 
Bar #3862 
BLACK & MOORE 
261 East Broadway, Suite uiO 
Salt Lake City, DT 84111 
Telephone: 363-2727 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
l" M.JN" rOK SALT i.-Ah'' COUNTS, 
STATE OF UTAH 
TIMOTHY BOSCH, 
COMPLAINT 
BUSCH DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
Defendant. 
:ivn *«.f?y-4fff 
y*. <%* £ tf-iZT. 
action claims ,• alleges as follows? 
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5. That plaintiff, in the course of placing rock panels 
on the face of the building at Busch Parkf while trying to gain 
access to the outside of the building on the third floor of the 
building across steel girders, did fall and suffer severe personal 
injuries as hereinafter alleged. 
6. That as a result of the fall, plaintiff has been caused 
personal injuries requiring payment of medical expenses, lost 
earnings and earning potential, physical and emotional pain and 
suffering. 
FIRST, .CAUSE OF ACTION 
7. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 
6 above and further alleges as follows: 
8. That defendant Busch Development, Inc., was negligent 
in the following particulars: 
a. Failure to provide a safe and adequate workplace 
for the employees of independent contractors who are business 
invitees on the construction site of Busch Park; 
b. Failure to provide proper ladders, scaffolding, 
tools, access routes and safety devices to business invitees 
at said Busch Park? 
c. Failure to provide proper guarding, safety belts, 
nets or other devices to protect business invitees from falling 
or suffering severe personal injury as a result of falls while 
conducting their business on the premises; 
2 
d . -Fa i J on H l ii |ni MMJ in i l f dilr-Mjihil v in n n 1mi i i n i mist r a r t i or is 
to business invitees regarding the unreasonably dangerous nature 
premises of Busch Park during its development phase. 
. 9„ That as a direct and proximate resull. of the above iieg 1 igen) 
acts by defendantf plaintiff was caused to suffer personal injuries 
damage &nd Iu^s, ' , ' , 
a. Severe crushing, damage, and bruising of the spinal 
fl-
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 Fractures of both feet; 
Multiple fractures of both legs; 
d. F -, 
Severe shock . plaintiff's .nervous system and 
*rment general health; 
severe and extensive loss *ii bodily Junction m*l 
disfigurement; 
of, and permanent loss of earning capacity i n the future; 
h » Medi c a ] , hospi t .a ] and doctor bills which are continuing 
and ongoing in nature, the amount of which will be subject to 
proof at trial; 
i • .'wi.i U.i l , i I 11 M i < Hied,] i a I Oil i , 
10. That as a result ot the foregoing, plaintiff has suffered 
genera 1 damages for his pain and suffering, both mental and physical, 
for his loss of bodily function and disfigurement, for the shock 
and injury to hi .s i iervous system •n- amount of $l,500,000o00; 
for spec i a 1 d a m a g « -.; i i: I g s a i: I d e a r n i n g 
capacity/ hospital/ doctors and medical expenses/ prosthetic 
devices in such sums as will be subject to proof at trial. 
NOW WHEREFORE plaintiff prays for general damages as alleged 
in the sum of $1/500/000*00/ for special damages as shall be 
proved at trial/ for interest on his special damages according 
to Utah law/ for his costs herein incurred/ and for such other 
and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable under 
the circumstances. 
DATED this _ day of September, 1984. 
4 
